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FIXING RULE 702: THE PCAST REPORT
AND STEPS TO ENSURE THE RELIABILITY
OF FORENSIC FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS
Eric S. Lander*
INTRODUCTION
Within the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 marks the crossroads of
law and science. For the most part, courts hear testimony about ordinary
factual matters, which the triers of fact can evaluate based on common
knowledge and experience (e.g., “the attacker had light brown hair”). But,
the law recognizes that its search for truth may sometimes be aided by hearing
the conclusions of experts with specialized scientific knowledge (e.g., “the
hair found at the scene of the crime was microscopically indistinguishable
from the defendant’s hair with respect to seven specific parameters, and
scientific studies show that this degree of similarity would be seen for only
roughly 1 person in 10,000 in the population”).
There is an obvious risk in permitting testimony from witnesses who come
cloaked in the mantle of scientific authority, purporting to possess powerful
knowledge that lies beyond the ken of ordinary people. Few jurors are
equipped to assess the basis of an expert’s reasoning—and cross-examination
is a blunt instrument for probing complex scientific claims. As a result,
expert conclusions must often be taken at face value. When the conclusions
are wrong, they may be highly prejudicial, outweighing other evidence or the
lack thereof.
Rule 702 therefore seeks to impose a strict limitation on the admissibility
of expert testimony. Courts may not simply allow expert testimony that
might be relevant and “let the jury decide.” Instead, Rule 702 provides that
judges may permit expert testimony only if they find that “the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods” and “the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”1
* President and Founding Director, Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard. Former Co-Chair,
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. This Article was prepared for
the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, held on October 27,
2017, at Boston College School of Law. The Symposium took place under the sponsorship of
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. For an overview of the
Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword: Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony,
Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 (2018).
1. FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d).
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In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Rule 702 requires courts to serve as “gatekeepers” who must
assess the underlying “reliability” of proffered expert testimony. While
recognizing that the inquiry should be “flexible” (that is, tailored to the type
of scientific knowledge being proffered), the meaning of “reliability” must
be based on actual “scientific validity”: the trial judge must determine
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid”;3 “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary
reliability will be based on scientific validity”;4 and the “overarching subject
[of a judge’s inquiry under Rule 702] is the scientific validity—and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission.”5 Rule 702 (as well as cognate rules in many states)
thus necessitates a dialog between law and science.
Many commentators agree that, in civil litigation, Rule 702 has largely
fulfilled the intended goal. By preventing juries from hearing evidence that
purports to be scientific but does not actually rest on scientifically valid
methods, it has acted as a quality-control filter.
In contrast, Rule 702 has largely failed in criminal law—even though
quality control should be more important when depriving individuals of
liberty than of money.6 Various explanations have been suggested for the
failure, including that the vast majority of forensic science laboratories serve
only one side, the prosecution; most defendants lack the resources to mount
serious challenges; and judges are reluctant to question practices that have
long been used and admitted in court. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that
courts have historically admitted—and continue today to admit—some
forensic-science methods that fail to meet the most basic requirements of
scientific validity.7
The risks are not merely hypothetical. Starting in the 1990s, DNA analysis
revealed that many individuals convicted of crimes were irrefutably
innocent.8 These discoveries have led so far to hundreds of exonerations,
including of inmates on death row or who had spent decades in prison.9 The
true number of wrongful convictions must be considerably larger since
evidence that could prove innocence is only rarely available and preserved.
Roughly half of these cases involved forensic-science evidence that was
faulty—sometimes egregiously so. The problem could not simply be blamed
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 591 n.9.
Id. at 594–95.
See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003).
7. See generally id.
8. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 44 n.94 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R76Y-7VU].
9. Id.
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on a few “bad apples” among forensic examiners. Rather, the failure was
systemic in that some of the supposedly scientific methods had never been
shown to be scientifically valid.
In 2005, Congress mandated that the National Research Council (NRC),
the research arm of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, undertake the
first serious study of forensic science. Published in early 2009, the NRC’s
report found disturbing problems across many commonly used forensic
methods, including a lack of rigorous and appropriate studies establishing
their scientific validity.10 In a scathing assessment, it found that “much
forensic evidence—including, for example, bite marks, firearm, and toolmark
identifications—is introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful
scientific validation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to
explain the limits of the discipline.”11
The NRC report made various recommendations, of which the most
important was the establishment of a federal agency to promote the
development of forensic science into a “mature field.”12 The report urged
that the agency have “a culture that is strongly rooted in science” and “must
not be part of a law enforcement agency,” owing to the inherent conflict of
interest between proponents and evaluators of forensic methods.13
The report triggered consternation among some in the forensic-science and
law enforcement communities. While some forensic scientists sought to
remedy the lack of evidence of scientific validity, many others disputed the
NRC’s assessment. For their part, prosecutors argued strenuously that, while
the NRC report had identified room for improvement, its findings should
have no bearing on the admissibility of commonly used forensic-science
methods.14
The Obama administration responded to the report in several ways. While
bowing to opposition by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) against
creating a forensic-science agency not tied to law enforcement, the
administration took three actions. First, it increased overall funding for
forensic-science research. Second, the DOJ, in collaboration with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), established the
National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS) to provide the Attorney
General with guidance and policy recommendations on forensic science.15
10. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ].
11. Id. at 107–08 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 81.
13. Id. at 80.
14. See generally Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent: The
Impact of the National Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic
Science Evidence in the United States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585 (2015); Paul C.
Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report: A Literature Review, 48 CRIM. L. BULL.
378 (2012).
15. National
Commission
on
Forensic
Science,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs [https://perma.cc/Z8C9-3QQ4] (last visited Feb. 14.
2018).
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Finally, the President tasked his President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) to recommend additional actions that the federal
government could take to ensure the scientific reliability of forensic evidence
used in the nation’s legal system.
PCAST is the leading scientific and technological advisory body to the
executive branch, originally chartered by President Eisenhower in the weeks
after the launch of Sputnik.16 Together with White House science advisor
John Holdren, I cochaired the council from 2009 to 2017. During this time,
PCAST prepared thirty-nine reports (including two classified reports)
making recommendations to the federal government on topics including
cybersecurity, biological weapons, nanotechnology, spectrum policy, climate
change, energy technologies, advanced manufacturing, ecosystems and the
economy, antibiotic resistance, drug discovery and development,
semiconductors, hearing aids, pandemic flu vaccines, health information
technology, STEM education, agriculture, and big data and privacy.17
PCAST’s report on forensic science, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts:
Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, was released
in September 2016.18 The unanimous report was the result of a year-long
study, during which PCAST reviewed 2100 scientific papers, as well as
hundreds of pages of input invited from the forensic-science community.
Forensic-science experts and others at the FBI and NIST provided valuable
and detailed assistance, including carefully reviewing multiple drafts of the
report. PCAST also constituted a panel of senior advisors, which included
ten current or former judges, a former U.S. Solicitor General, two law-school
deans, and two statisticians.19 As with all PCAST reports, the conclusions
represent those of the presidential science advisors. The complete report
included a 174-page main text, a 131-page appendix containing responses to
PCAST’s request for public input in 2015, a 98-page appendix listing the
scientific papers consulted, and a 9-page addendum approved on January 6,
2017.20
Agreeing with the NRC’s assessment that many forensic methods had long
been used in courts despite the lack of meaningful evidence of scientific
validity, PCAST focused considerable attention on the issue of the
admissibility of forensic testimony under Rule 702. The report outlined the
scientific meaning of “reliability” and “scientific validity” for a key class of
forensic methods—including how these concepts specifically relate to 702(c)

16. Celebrating the Contributions of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 9, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2017/01/09/celebrating-contributions-presidents-council-advisors-science-andtechnology [https://perma.cc/W4BZ-3B4P].
17. PCAST Documents & Reports, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
administration/eop/ostp/pcast/docsreports [https://perma.cc/P8YV-KVYX] (last visited Feb.
14, 2018).
18. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8.
19. Id. at viii–ix.
20. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8.
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and 702(d), which PCAST referred to respectively as “foundational validity”
and “validity as applied.”
The report made eight recommendations to the federal government,
including both the executive and judicial branches. Among these, PCAST
recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States, through its
Standing Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, should provide guidance
to the federal courts about the standards for admissibility under Rule 702 of
expert testimony on certain forensic-science methods, through a new
Advisory Committee note and a best-practices manual.21
In response to PCAST’s recommendation, the Standing Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules convened a meeting on forensic expert
testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702 on October 27, 2017, at Boston College
Law School to inform itself about the issues.22 The meeting included
presentations by twenty-six speakers (including myself) and discussion
among the attendees.
The purpose of this Article is to summarize aspects of the PCAST report
relevant to its recommendation to the Standing Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules and to propose a path forward with respect to Rule 702.
I. FORENSIC FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS
The PCAST report focused on a specific class of forensic methods, termed
“forensic feature-comparison methods.”23 The category includes the analysis
of DNA, hair, latent fingerprints, firearms and spent ammunition, toolmarks,
shoe prints and tire tracks, bite marks, and handwriting.24 In each method,
examiners compare distinctive features (e.g., DNA fragment sizes,
impressions, and so on) in two samples (e.g., from a crime scene and suspect)
to determine whether they are likely to come from the same source.25 Some
of the methods are fully objective, while others involve examiners making
subjective judgments.26
PCAST chose to focus on these methods for several reasons: the methods
are widely used in criminal forensics, practitioners have historically claimed
them to be highly accurate, the lay public largely regards them as highly
accurate, wrongful convictions have occurred in cases involving this class of
methods, and the methods all involve metrology—the science of
measurement and comparison—which is a discipline with well-defined
scientific standards.27 In short, it is both important and feasible to ensure that
these methods are reliable.

21. Id. at 145.
22. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE OCTOBER 2017 AGENDA
BOOK (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6FBAPZB]; Daniel J. Capra, Foreword: Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and
Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 (2018).
23. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 44.
24. Id. at 23.
25. Id. at 146.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Id. at 44–46.
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Forensic feature-comparison methods all involve answering two
fundamental questions:
(1) Do two samples match? More precisely, are their features within
a given degree of similarity?
(2) How meaningful is the match? More precisely, what is the
probability that two samples from different sources would show
features with the same degree of similarity?
Both questions must be answered before one can draw a conclusion about
the likely origin of a sample. The finding of a match between two samples
cannot be interpreted—in fact, it is meaningless—unless one knows how
often unrelated samples show the observed degree of match. It is obviously
crucial to know whether a method produces false-positive matches at a rate
of 1 in 5000 or 1 in 5.
U.S. District Judge John Potter nicely expressed this point in his opinion
in United States v. Yee,28 an early case on the use of DNA analysis: “Without
the probability assessment, the jury does not know what to make of the fact
that the patterns match: the jury does not know whether the patterns are as
common as pictures with two eyes, or as unique as the Mona Lisa.”29
II. SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FORENSIC
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS
According to Rule 702 and Daubert, courts must consider a key question:
What does it mean for a forensic feature-comparison method to be
scientifically valid?
The basic answer is simple: scientific validity requires empirical evidence
of how well a method works in practice. This is nothing more than a
restatement of the foundational principle of science established 400 years
ago—namely, that assertions about the world cannot be accepted based on
authority but must be subjected to empirical testing.
The PCAST report emphasized that direct empirical testing was the only
way to establish the scientific validity of a forensic feature-comparison
method—that nothing else could substitute for it.30 The report laid out for
courts the two essential elements31:
(1) Reproducible procedure. The method must have a well-defined,
reproducible procedure for identifying and comparing the
features in two samples and for determining whether they share
sufficient similarity (often called a matching rule). Without this,
one does not even have a method to test.
(2) Estimation of false-positive rate. The method must be
empirically tested, under conditions appropriate to the intended
28. 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993).
29. Id. at 181.
30. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 47.
31. Id. at 48.
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use, to determine its accuracy (i.e., how often samples from
different sources are erroneously declared to match), which must
be suitable for the intended use. Without this, the results cannot
be interpreted.
PCAST noted that scientific validity does not require that a method be
perfect.32 But, it does require knowing the chances of falsely declaring a
match between samples from different sources (e.g., 1 in 1 million, 1 in 600,
1 in 50, or 1 in 3).33
Feature-comparison methods can be classified as objective or subjective
depending on whether they involved significant human judgment.34
Subjective methods require special scrutiny because they effectively involve
a “black box” in each examiner’s head.35 To assess their accuracy, one must
therefore conduct so-called “black-box studies” in which one presents
examiners with samples from the same or different sources and records how
often examiners give the correct answer.36 As discussed below, the FBI
laboratory has done pioneering work using black-box studies to assess the
reliability of latent fingerprint analysis.37
The PCAST report noted six scientifically self-evident criteria for any
scientifically valid study to assess the accuracy of a method. Specifically, (1)
the study should employ samples that are representative of the intended
application and numerous enough to provide a meaningful estimate of
accuracy, (2) examiners should not know the correct answers in advance nor
should the study design allow them to make inferences about the correct
answers, (3) the criteria for evaluating the study (especially what constitutes
an error) should be specified in advance, not after seeing the results, (4) the
study should be conducted or overseen by scientists with no stake in the
outcome, (5) the results should be available for review by other scientists,
and (6) the conclusions should be reproduced by a second group.38
Strikingly, PCAST’s report produced diametrically opposed reactions. To
scientists, the discussion of scientific validity seemed obvious. By contrast,
many forensic practitioners and prosecutors objected to the idea that
empirical testing was an absolute requirement. Instead, they insisted,
forensic methods could be considered “reliable” even without direct
empirical testing to assess their accuracy. To grasp this response, it is
necessary to understand the history of forensic science.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id. at 49.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. Once the accuracy of a method has
been established, one can also use “white-box studies” to try to shed light on factors that affect
examiners’ accuracy. Although not necessary for admissibility, such studies can be valuable
for improving a method. For a brief description of a white-box study the FBI has conducted,
see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 99–100.
38. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 52–53.

1668

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

III. THE LONG AND UNFINISHED PATH
FROM FORENSICS TO FORENSIC SCIENCE
Forensic feature-comparison methods (with the notable exception of DNA
analysis) did not emerge from scientific laboratories but rather were
developed by police departments as rough-and-ready tools to aid in criminal
investigations.39 As a result, practitioners of these methods devoted much
effort to practical issues, such as characterizing features and refining
laboratory techniques, but paid virtually no attention to the foundational issue
of accuracy.40
PCAST surveyed the troubling history for five non-DNA-based featurecomparison disciplines: latent fingerprints, firearms, hair, bite marks, and
footwear.41 In each case, the disciplines were admitted in court based on
extraordinary claims unsupported by empirical evidence. Only slowly are
these claims being subjected to empirical testing—revealing that they were
grossly inaccurate, often by many orders of magnitude.42
The history might be characterized as having three successive stages: (1)
data-free theories, (2) spurious estimates, and (3) meaningful empirical
testing. We discuss these stages in turn, with an overview provided in Table
1.
A. Stage 1: Data-Free Theories
In this stage, various types of arguments are made about why a method
should, in principle, be extremely accurate—without actually testing the
method empirically. Much attention, for example, has been devoted to
“uniqueness studies” aimed at proving that no two objects give identical
patterns (e.g., fingerprints, shoe prints), with the implication that featurecomparison analysis will thus never yield false positives. For example, in a
2012 paper on shoe prints, the author studied thirty-nine Adidas Supernova
Classic size-twelve running shoes worn by a single runner over eight years,
by applying black shoe polish to the soles and having the owner carefully
produce tread marks by walking on sheets of legal paper on a hardwood floor.
The author reported that small identifying differences could be found
between different pairs of shoes.43
The PCAST report noted that:
uniqueness studies miss the fundamental point. The issue is not whether
objects or features differ; they surely do if one looks at a fine enough level.
The issue is how well and under what circumstances examiners applying a
39. Id. at 32.
40. See id. at 32–33.
41. Id. at 83–122.
42. See id. at 76 (describing an instance where the prosecutor told the jury that the chance
of a false positive was 1 in 1 billion when the actual probability could have been as low as 1
in 2); see also infra tbl.1.
43. See id. at 62 (citing Hilary D. Wilson, Comparison of the Individual Characteristics
in the Outsoles of Thirty-Nine Pairs of Adidas Supernova Classic Shoes, 62 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 194 (2012)).
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given metrological method can reliably detect relevant differences in
features to reliably identify whether they share a common source.
Uniqueness studies, which focus on the properties of features themselves,
can therefore never establish whether a particular method for measuring
and comparing features is foundationally valid. Only empirical studies can
do so.44

Another popular approach has been to invoke mathematical calculations.
In such studies, authors consider various types of features that might make
up a pattern and calculate the number of patterns that might theoretically
arise. Given enough features assumed to occur independently and be
detected perfectly, the potential number of patterns is guaranteed to be
astronomical. A widely cited 1984 paper measured twelve parameters in
roughly 400 bite marks carefully made in wax wafers and calculated that the
chance that two different sources would produce matching bite marks is less
than one in six trillion.45 The paper was entirely theoretical: it did not even
undertake any actual comparisons.46 Similarly, a 2006 paper on footwear
examination, cited by the FBI, used a mathematical model to assert that the
chance that two shoe prints from different sources would share three
characteristics was less than 1 in 683 billion.47 Again, the study analyzed no
actual shoe prints.48
A third solution was simply to declare that methods are perfect. The DOJ
took this approach in its 1984 publication The Science of Fingerprints, which
asserted that, “Of all the methods of identification, fingerprinting alone has
proved to be both infallible and feasible.”49 At the time, no empirical studies
of accuracy had been undertaken.50 The DOJ conceded in a 2016 draft
guidance document about appropriate language for testimony and reports that
this earlier assertion was unjustified.51
The Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) provides
an example of data-free circular reasoning in its Theory of Identification as
It Relates to Toolmarks.52 The “theory” (1) declares that an examiner is
44. Id.
45. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 84. See
generally Raymond D. Rawson et al., Statistical Evidence for the Individuality of the Human
Dentition, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. 245 (1984).
46. See generally Rawson et al., supra note 45. As discussed below, recent empirical
studies of bite-mark examiners have found stunningly high error rates.
47. See generally Rocky S. Stone, Footwear Examinations: Mathematical Probabilities
of Theoretical Individual Characteristics, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 577 (2006).
48. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 115.
49. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND
USES, at iv (1984).
50. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 87 (citing FBI,
supra note 49).
51. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE PROPOSED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE FORENSIC
LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 15 (2016)).
52. See generally Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm & Tool Mark
Identification, Theory of Identification as It Relates to Toolmarks: Revised, 43 AFTE J. 287
(2011).
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justified in concluding that two toolmarks have a common origin if they are
in “sufficient agreement” and (2) defines “sufficient agreement” as meaning
that the agreement between the two toolmarks is such that it is a “practical
impossibility” that they have different origins.53 AFTE still contends that its
document constitutes a meaningful scientific theory.
From a scientific standpoint, such efforts to justify forensic featurecomparison methods as scientifically valid would be amusing—except that
the arguments were accepted by courts in criminal cases.
B. Stage 2: Spurious Estimates
In this stage, estimates of accuracy are made based on contrived situations
that do not correspond to the method’s use in practice. Expert testimony in
2009 by a former head of the FBI’s fingerprint unit provides an example of
how not to estimate accuracy from empirical data. He told the court that the
FBI’s latent fingerprint analysis had “an error rate of one per every 11 million
cases.”54 He had arrived at that estimate, he explained, because among 11
million fingerprint identifications performed by the agency, he was aware of
only one error.55
In a classic study of microscopic hair analysis in the 1970s (and quoted
approvingly by the DOJ in 2016), all pairwise comparisons were performed
between hairs from different sources and showed a remarkably low falsepositive rate of 1 in 40,000.56 Unfortunately, the result is meaningless
because the examiner knew that every comparison involved hairs from
different sources!57 With no risk of missing true matches, they could safely
focus on finding differences—whether real or imagined.58 As noted below,
a rigorous evaluation of hair analysis found a dramatically higher falsepositive rate.59
Finally, firearms analysis presents a subtler issue. Starting about two
decades ago, forensic scientists undertook studies in which they presented
examiners with samples of spent ammunition and asked them to identify a
match within a set of samples fired from a collection of known guns.60 The
examiners performed well, with a false-positive rate of roughly 1 in 5000.61
However, these studies had serious flaws. In contrast to casework, many
involved “closed set” comparisons, where examiners knew or could infer that
53. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 59 (citing
Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm & Toolmark Identification, supra note 52).
54. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990–91 (10th Cir. 2009).
55. Id. at 989.
56. B.D. Gaudette & E.S. Keeping, An Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human
Scalp Hair Comparisons, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 599, 599 (1974); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 28.
57. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 118–19 (citing
Gaudette & Keeping, supra note 56).
58. See id.
59. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
60. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 106–09.
61. Id. at 111.
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a correct answer was always present in the known set.62 Such knowledge
provides a big leg up: examiners can safely match an unknown sample to the
closest matching known (rather than worrying that there may not be a
match).63 In some studies, they could use results from some samples to
narrow the options for other samples.64 The Director of the Defense Forensic
Science Center analogized such studies to solving a “Sudoku” puzzle, where
initial answers can be used to help fill in subsequent answers.65
In fairness, the scientists who designed the studies likely did not recognize
the problem. However, recent studies that employed “open-set” designs
(where examiners have no ancillary information bearing on whether any pair
of samples matches) have yielded error rates closer to 1 in 50—that is, one
hundredfold higher than the earlier closed-set designs.66 PCAST rejected the
earlier studies as providing overly optimistic estimates of accuracy.67
C. Stage 3: Meaningful Empirical Testing
In this final stage, forensic scientists obtain a scientifically valid measure
of accuracy by conducting black-box studies that directly measure
examiners’ accuracy in a setting that resembles the method’s use in practice
but in which the evaluators know the right answers. Notably, the first blackbox studies for subjective feature-comparison methods were only undertaken
after the NRC report called attention to the lack of evidence for scientific
validity for most forensic methods.68
The first properly designed black-box study on latent fingerprint analysis
was reported in 2011.69 In a paper by FBI scientists and their collaborators
published in the prestigious journal Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, they asked each of 169 examiners to analyze 100 pairs of
fingerprints.70 The paper found a false identification rate of roughly 1 in 600
(with a confidence interval ranging up to 1 in 300).71 A subsequent blackbox study conducted by the Miami-Dade Police Department Forensic
Services Bureau, with funding from the National Institute of Justice, found a
higher error rate of 1 in 137 (if one excludes false positives that the authors
suggest are likely to represent clerical errors) or 1 in 24 (if one includes these
errors, as one would in a clinical trial).72 These error rates are a far cry from

62. Id. at 108–09.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 109–11.
67. Id. at 111.
68. Id. at 9, 11.
69. See generally Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent
Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7733 (2011).
70. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 94 (citing Ulery
et al., supra note 69).
71. Id. (citing Ulery et al., supra note 69).
72. Id. at 94–95 (citing IGOR PACHECO ET AL., MIAMI-DADE RESEARCH STUDY FOR THE
RELIABILITY OF THE ACE-V PROCESS: ACCURACY AND PRECISION IN LATENT FINGERPRINT
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the DOJ’s original claim of infallibility, but they are perfectly serviceable
estimates of reliability that would allow a jury to weigh fingerprint testimony
relative to other evidence in a criminal case.
The first black-box study of firearms analysis was reported by the Ames
Laboratory in 2014; the work was stimulated and funded by the Defense
Forensic Science Center, whose director had criticized the Sudoku-like
nature of previous closed-set studies.73 Similar in its basic design to the
FBI’s latent-fingerprint study, the authors evaluated the performance of 218
examiners on fifteen separate comparison problems.74 They reported an error
rate of 1 in 66 (with a confidence interval ranging to 1 in 46).75 As noted
above, the error rate is approximately one hundredfold higher than the closedset studies.76 With only a single well-designed study estimating accuracy,
PCAST judged that firearms analysis fell just short of the criteria for
scientific validity, which requires reproducibility.77 A second study would
solve this problem.
Although black-box studies have not yet been conducted for other
disciplines, PCAST summarized the limited scientific studies undertaken for
hair and bite-mark analysis.78 The papers are notable because they debunk
past claims about the accuracy of these disciplines.
A 2002 paper by FBI scientists revealed a stunningly high falseidentification rate for hair analysis.79 The study did not present examiners
with test problems but rather used DNA analysis to reexamine hair samples
from actual criminal cases that FBI examiners had declared were
microscopically indistinguishable.80 In contrast to earlier work claiming that
hairs from different sources could be distinguished with an error rate of only
1 in 40,000 comparisons, DNA analysis of casework revealed that 11 percent
of hairs (that is, 1 in 9) reported as microscopically indistinguishable actually
came from different sources.81
Only a few small empirical studies have been reported on the accuracy of
bite-mark examiners. The results have been consistently appalling. In a 2010
paper, for example, twenty-nine examiners were asked to inspect
EXAMINATIONS
(2014),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248534.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4FZ6-F9N7]).
73. See generally DAVID P. BALDWIN ET AL., A STUDY OF FALSE-POSITIVE AND FALSENEGATIVE
ERROR
RATES
IN
CARTRIDGE
CASE
COMPARISONS
(2014),
https://afte.org/uploads/documents/swggun-false-postive-false-negative-usdoe.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3JXK-6FS4].
74. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 109–10 (citing
BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 73).
75. Id. at 110–11 (citing BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 73).
76. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
77. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 111.
78. Id. at 117.
79. See generally Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and
Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964 (2002).
80. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 8, at 28 (citing Houck
& Budowle, supra note 79).
81. Id. (citing Houck & Budowle, supra note 79).

2018]

FIXING RULE 702

1673

photographs of bite marks (produced in pig flesh by a mechanical biting
machine using human dentition) and decide whether they came from
individuals A, B, C, or none of the above.82 When the correct answer was
“none of the above,” the examiners nonetheless attributed the bite marks to
one of the three known sources for 17 percent of samples (that is, 1 in 6).83
Other studies showed that bite-mark examiners performed poorly even in a
closed-set design, when the correct source was always provided (error rates
of 1 in 9).84
Finally, PCAST could find few relevant papers on footwear analysis and
none that even came close to providing a serious evaluation of scientific
validity.85
D. Current Status of Forensic Methods
In summary, there has been some progress since the NRC’s report in 2009.
Empirical studies have now provided scientifically valid estimates of the
accuracy of latent fingerprint analysis, and firearms analysis is coming close
to achieving the standard for scientific validity. With respect to hair analysis,
little has been done to address the poor ability to distinguish different-source
samples in casework revealed by the FBI’s study. At the least, juries should
be told that 1 in 9 identifications in casework proved to come from different
sources. As for bite-mark analysis, the field does not appear to be
salvageable; it should be abandoned. Finally, footwear analysis has yet to be
subjected to empirical testing—although it continues to be used in court.
In light of the historical (and in some cases continuing) lack of empirical
evidence, what has given forensic practitioners confidence that their methods
were reliable? The answer is that they have had faith in their processes.
Specifically, they point to (1) examiners’ extensive “experience” and
“judgment” in the course of casework and (2) good professional practices,
such as the existence of professional societies, certification programs, peerreviewed articles, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics.
There is a gaping hole in this logic. Extensive experience and good
professional practices are clearly important, and forensic practitioners should
be commended for their attention to these matters. But, experience and
professional practices can never establish whether a method itself is
reliable—for the simple reason that neither assesses a method’s accuracy.
Experience in casework provides no information about accuracy because the
right answer is not known in casework. And, professional practices concern
process not results.
To grasp the importance of this point, one need only note that practitioners
of pseudoscience—such as psychics—can make the same claims about their
fields. Psychics can claim extensive experience in mindreading and
soothsaying, and they too have professional societies, certification programs,
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 117.
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peer-reviewed journals, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics. Despite
these trappings of science, psychics’ claims are not accepted as scientifically
valid—and are not admissible under Rule 702—because their methods have
not withstood appropriate empirical testing to determine their accuracy.
For forensic methods to be accepted as reliable and scientifically valid,
there is simply no substitute for actual empirical testing of accuracy.
IV. THE DOJ’S RESISTANCE TO ADDRESSING THE
ISSUES OF SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY
For its part, the DOJ has resisted the necessity of empirical testing. The
resistance is understandable: acknowledging the need for empirical testing
might lead to calls to revisit past convictions or jeopardize ongoing cases
involving evidence based on forensic-science methods that had not been
empirically shown to be reliable. The DOJ has thus sought to block or blunt
recommendations from the scientific community.
When the NRC recommended the creation of a federal office separate from
law enforcement to ensure the quality of forensic science,86 the DOJ
successfully lobbied for a weaker solution: an outside advisory committee
that would make recommendations to the Attorney General. The National
Commission on Forensic Sciences was established in 2013 but soon ran into
trouble when the DOJ’s efforts to limit the body’s scope caused a federal
judge who served on the commission to resign in protest.87 The DOJ reversed
course, and the commissioner returned.88 The Commission made various
recommendations, but only a few were implemented by the Attorney
General.
When PCAST briefed the DOJ on its preliminary conclusions at a meeting
that I attended in late May 2016, DOJ officials acknowledged the lack of
empirical studies establishing reliability for some disciplines but expressed
concerns that the report could affect past convictions and ongoing cases. The
DOJ proposed that PCAST delay its report until December 2016 and declare
that its findings should not be applied retroactively.
While understanding the reasons for the DOJ’s concern, PCAST declined
these suggestions. In particular, it saw no scientific basis for distinguishing
between past and present applications of forensic science. However,
consistent with its past practices, PCAST invited the DOJ to provide
comments on the draft report and identify any relevant material that PCAST
might have missed. PCAST revised the report in response to several rounds

86. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 19–22.
87. Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Judge Quits Commission to Protest Justice Department Forensic
Science Policy, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/usjudge-quits-commission-to-protest-justice-department-forensic-science-policy/2015/01/29/
cbed0a84-a7bb-11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html [http://perma.cc/MA55-QR99].
88. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Rakoff Returns to Forensic Panel After Justice Department
Backs Off Decision, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/crime/in-reversal-doj-lets-forensic-panel-suggest-trial-rule-changes-after-us-judgeprotests/2015/01/30/2f031d9e-a89c-11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6SBC-Q7UW].
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of comments from the DOJ, including many helpful suggestions from the FBI
laboratory.
In the end, however, the DOJ insisted, in written communications with
PCAST, that the implications for Rule 702 should be deleted from the report.
In its judgment, the President’s science advisory council had no business
opining on the meaning of scientific validity as it pertains to the admissibility
of expert scientific testimony. Moreover, the DOJ asserted, the references in
Daubert to evidentiary reliability being based on scientific validity were
merely dicta. The DOJ asked the White House to block the release of the
PCAST report, but the White House declined to do so.
When PCAST released its report on September 20, the Attorney General
thanked PCAST for its work but stated that the agency would not accept the
council’s recommendations.89 The statement also claimed PCAST had failed
to mention “numerous published research studies” and that this “omission
discredits the PCAST report as a thorough evaluation of scientific validity.”90
In response to a request from PCAST to identify relevant omissions, the DOJ
eventually concluded in December 2016 that it could find none.91
Following the presidential transition in January 2017, the Attorney General
decided to terminate the NCFS by allowing its charter to expire in April
2017.92 The DOJ instead chose to rely solely on its own internal Senior
Advisor on Forensics.93 Whereas the previous incumbent had been a forensic
scientist, the DOJ in August 2017 tapped as its new advisor a prosecutor
without scientific training who had served as a law enforcement
representative on the NCFS.94 The new advisor has employed tactics often
used to resist scientific consensus, such as characterizing basic scientific
statements as extreme and alleging substantial disagreement within the
scientific community. For example, at the symposium organized by the
89. Gary Fields, White House Advisory Council Report Is Critical of Forensics Used in
Criminal Trials, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whitehouse-advisory-council-releases-report-critical-of-forensics-used-in-criminal-trials1474394743 [https://perma.cc/W84T-WNDA].
90. Comments on: President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology Report
to the President, FBI (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-pcastresponse.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9UQ-JEU4].
91. See President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., An Addendum to the PCAST
Report on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts, WHITE HOUSE 5 (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_foren
sics_addendum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A4D-57HX].
92. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New
Initiatives to Advance Forensic Science and Help Counter the Rise in Violent Crime (Apr. 10,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-newinitiatives-advance-forensic-science-and-help [https://perma.cc/4JGZ-VPEG].
93. See id.
94. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Plans to Advance
Forensic Science (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentannounces-plans-advance-forensic-science [https://perma.cc/F7Y3-FNPB]; see also Radley
Balko, Deputy AG Announces New Forensic Science Working Group but Still Doesn’t Grasp
the Extent of Problem, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/07/deputy-ag-announces-new-forensic-science-working-groupbut-still-doesnt-grasp-the-extent-of-problem [https://perma.cc/G7CY-EPWT].

1676

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Standing Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, the DOJ took the position
that (1) PCAST’s list of criteria for reliability studies was a radical
“nonseverable six-part test” (without actually identifying any criteria that
were not correct)95 and (2) a recent report by the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) supposedly held that empirical testing,
as described in the PCAST report, was not the only way to establish the
reliability of forensic feature-comparison methods.96 The AAAS swiftly
rejected the claim, issuing a statement that the PCAST and AAAS reports
were in complete agreement on the issue.97 In summary, it is not realistic to
count on law enforcement to drive progress.
V. FIXING RULE 702
With respect to forensic science, Rule 702 has clearly failed to accomplish
its goal of ensuring that expert testimony must be based on reliable methods.
Courts routinely admit testimony about feature-comparison methods that
claim to be able to identify the source of a sample with high accuracy—even
when the reliability of the methods have never been tested or when the
methods have been tested and found to be unreliable.
The leading scientific advisory groups chartered by the legislative and
executive branches—the National Academy of Sciences and the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology—have now weighed in.
They have unanimously agreed that methods have historically lacked
meaningful scientific validation, that their accuracy has been seriously
overstated, and that their misuse has led to wrongful convictions. Moreover,
they agree that requiring empirical testing is feasible and would increase the
quality of forensic science—with benefits for prosecutors, defendants, and
the public.
To fix Rule 702, it is important to understand some reasons for its failure.
First, many judges simply do not know how to apply the concepts of
reliability and scientific validity to any given scientific discipline. In the
absence of a clear definition, they are often willing to accept the trappings of
reliability (examiners’ experience and professional practices) rather than
insist on actual reliability. Second, many judges are also reluctant to
challenge longstanding precedents concerning the admissibility of forensic
methods, even when they were established long before current problems
became apparent.
How, then, to restore the role of courts, articulated in Daubert, as
gatekeepers ensuring quality control? The appellate process is not well suited
to the task. Even if an appeals court wished to do so, it would be hampered
by the high standard (abuse of discretion) for overturning admissibility
decisions. And, because the vast majority of criminal cases occur in the state
95. See Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1463, 1520 (2018) (statement of Ted R. Hunt).
96. Id.
97. William C. Thompson, AAAS, PCAST and Validation: Questions and Answers, AM.
ASS’N ADVANCEMENT SCI. (2017), https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/QA%20AAAS%20and%20PCAST%20Reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKS2-RS4Z].
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courts, establishing a coherent jurisprudence would require parallel progress
on the many cognate versions of Rule 702.
Instead, PCAST recommended that the most effective solution would be
for the Judicial Conference of the United States to clarify the meaning of
“reliable methods” for forensic feature-comparison methods. PCAST
proposed that the Standing Advisory Committee on Evidence issue a new
advisory committee note and a best-practices manual to provide clear
guidance for courts. Alternatively or additionally, the committee could
propose a revision to the Federal Rules of Evidence.98
Whatever the mechanism, the key message should be roughly the
following:
An expert witness may provide testimony based on a forensic examination
conducted to determine whether an evidentiary sample is similar or
identical to a source sample if (in addition to satisfying existing
requirements under Rule 702):
(i) the witness’s method is sufficiently repeatable, reproducible, and
accurate for its intended use, as shown by empirical studies conducted
under conditions appropriate to the intended use;
(ii) the witness is capable of applying the method reliably and actually
did so; and
(iii) the witness accurately states the probative value of the meaning of
any similarity or match between the samples.

With respect to the third point, it is useful to give a specific example of
appropriate testimony. Suppose that two proper black-box studies have been
performed and published. The data in each study allows empirical estimates
to be made of a method’s error rate. Courts should require a witness to
describe in clear and simple terms what is known about accuracy and error
rate based on these studies. An appropriate statement would be:
Examiners sometimes make mistakes in associating a sample with a
particular individual.
Studies have therefore been done to see
approximately how often such errors occur in situations similar to this one.
In one study, examiners made false associations at a rate of 1 in every 300
comparisons performed. Given the number of tests carried out, the true
error rate in this study might be somewhat higher—possibly 1 in 150. In a
second study, examiners made false associations at a rate of 1 in every 75
comparisons; given the number of tests carried out, the true error rate in
this study might be 1 in 40. In short, the method usually gives the correct
answer, but errors do occur.

One might be tempted to try to craft a general rule that would provide
guidance not just for forensic feature-comparison methods, but for all
forensic-science testimony in criminal cases. But, such a course would be

98. Under current practices, new advisory notes are not issued without a change to the
rules themselves. It might be worth loosening this stricture in appropriate circumstances.
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problematic. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes cautioned, “the life of the
law . . . is experience.”99
We now have two decades of experience illuminating the problems and
solutions for forensic feature-comparison methods. When adequate
experience arises for other areas, they may be addressed in turn. It may not
be necessary to repeat this exercise many times. Even a few examples may
suffice to signal to courts that they should engage more generally in the
essential dialog, contemplated in Daubert, between law and science.

99. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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Table 1: Summary of Claims About the Accuracy
of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods

Method

Stage 1:
Data-Free
Theories

Stage 2:
Spurious
Estimates

Fingerprints

“Infallible”

1 in 11
million
1 in 5000
1 in 40,000
n/a
n/a

Firearms
Hair Analysis
Bite marks
Footwear

n/a
n/a
1 in 6 trillion
1 in 683 billion

Stage 3:
Meaningful
Empirical
Testing
1 in 600
1 in 50
1 in 9100
1 in 6101
None

100. Well-designed black-box studies have not been performed for this discipline, but other
studies showed extremely high error rates. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
101. Well-designed black-box studies have not been performed for this discipline, but other
studies showed extremely high error rates. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.

